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1 Introduction
My target article outlines a pragmatic theory centred on the notion of commit-
ment, which I believe is simpler and more general than what has been on offer so
far. First, I argue that commitments are involved in a wider variety of utterances
than are covered by alternative accounts, and are also the basis for turn-taking
(question–answer, greeting–greeting, and so on). Second, the theory features a
new analysis of common ground in terms of commitment sharing, which not only
accommodates assertions and presuppositions, but affords a general account of
how the common ground is changed by speech acts and the responses they elicit
from their addressees. Third, the theory includes and extends the Gricean theory
of cooperative communication, which also accounts for the sincerity inferences
associated with various speech act types. Last, the theory shows how we can get
much of our communicative business done without attributing mental states to
each other, thus paving the way for a better understanding of the phylogeny and
ontogeny of human communication.
These are the main ideas, and I am pleasantly surprised to see that the crit-
ical responses to my article are, on the whole, constructive and supportive. At
the same time, I find it oddly reassuring that there is a small but vocal minor-
ity representing the intentionalist establishment, who find no merit in my theory
whatsoever, and are out for the kill. As Nietzsche used to say, what does not kill
you makes you stronger.
In the following, I will address a fair number of the issues raised bymy critics,
but first I would like to clarify my project by mentioning some of the objectives I
was not trying to achieve. To beginwith, it was notmy purpose to provide, defend,
or criticize any taxonomy of speech acts, or analyse in detail any type of speech
act; nor did I want even to suggest, let alone argue, that an industrial strength
theory of speech acts can be built from commitments alone. If there are gaps in
my theory (and there are many), I will first try to fill them with such conceptual
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equipment as I have, but failing that I will be happy to extend my toolkit. Finally,
althoughmyproject is informed by the conviction that the intentionalist approach
to pragmatics is on the wrong track, I made no serious attempt to argue against
it.1 I merely intended to issue a reminder that intentionalism is faced with seri-
ous difficulties, the most pressing of which have to do with the development and
evolution of communication. I am by no means the first to point this out, but a
full-dress discussion was way beyond the scope of my target article, and although
I feel compelled to say a bit more about this topic below, it is beyond the scope
of this note, too (for more substantial discussion, see e.g. Gauker 2003, Breheny
2006, Bar-On 2013, or Abramova 2018).
2 Communication and information transfer
Information is cheap and abundant. Every move I make carries information of
some sort, and it would be foolish to hold, as Harris claims I do, that speech acts
need not involve any information transfer. I don’t believe that. In fact, I don’t deny
that the great majority of speech acts convey information about speakers’ mental
states; for instance, that they are not comatose. But then, every speech act con-
veys the information that the speaker has a pulse, and just as I don’t want to
say that that is its purpose, I don’t want to say that, in general, the first purpose
of communication is to exchange information about mental states. My slogan
is that human communication is a form of coordinated action whose first pur-
pose is action coordination. Green interprets this as implying that “any transfer
of information is a form of coordination.” (p. 43) I don’t believe that, either, and
to the best of my knowledge I never even hint anything of the sort.
Harris observes that, on my account, it is possible for a speech act to result
in it becoming common ground that p while at the same time it is mutual belief
between the conversational participants that ¬p. On Harris’s diagnosis, this is a
consequence of disconnecting communication from information exchange, and
he considers it to be problematic for my account and unproblematic for inten-
tionalism. Interestingly, the kind of scenario that Harris uses to argue in favour of
intentionalism has recently been used by Lewis (2019) to argue against the same
doctrine (as noted by Zaefferer). The following vignette is Lewis’s Case 2:
1 Previously, I did not use the term “intentionalism,” but since it is used by Green and Harris, I
will follow suit, taking it to refer to the view that communication is a matter of expressing and
grasping communicative intentions by speakers and hearers, respectively.
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Jane and Kelly are looking to put together a team for the local recreational basketball league.
They [. . . ] both have atypical experiences with regards to the heights of the people they
regularly encounter. They live in a house with a lot of people who are well below average
height, including themselves. The members of their small group of friends and family are
all well below average height, and they don’t regularly see many other people. [. . . ] It is well
known between them that they consider 5 feet [1.52m] to be tall. Determined to get more
involved in their community, they decide to put together this team. Jane says: “Let’s put
Lara on the team. Lara is tall.”
In fact, Lara’s height is 5 foot 2 (1.57 m), and therefore Jane’s statement is false:
relative to Jane and Kelly’s goal to put together a team for the local recreational
basketball league, Lara does not count as tall. But at the same time it is mutual
belief between the two women that Lara is tall. My commitment-based frame-
work allows us to represent this situation in terms of social and individual
commitments of the atelic variety. Whereas on the social level:
Cj,k¬t Ck,j¬t Cj,kCk,j¬t Ck,jCj,k¬t . . .
on the individual level we have:
Cj,jt Ck,kt Cj,jCk,ktt Ck,kCj,jt . . .
Put otherwise, while Jane and Kelly are mutually committed to act on Lara is not
tall, it is mutual belief between them that Lara is tall. On this analysis, there is
common ground on two levels, which should be and usually are in sync, but not
in this scenario, because it implies an infinite series of violations of the Integrity
maxim, which entails, for starters, that given Cj,k¬t, it should not be the case that
Cj,jt.
Harris’s objection may now be expressed as follows. Our actions are shaped
by our beliefs. Social commitments don’t affect our actions; they are “causally
inert”. Hence, it is our beliefs, not our social commitments, that are relevant for
explaining our actions. However, this is like saying that a description of a game
of chess need not refer to the rules of chess, because it is only the players’ psy-
chological states that matter; the rule book is “causally inert”. Just as the rules of
chess are essential for understanding what’s going on when two people are push-
ing little pieces of wood across a checkered board, Jane and Kelly’s actions are
governed by their social commitments even when they are not fully aligned with
their beliefs. If Jane and Kelly manage to put together a basketball team with Lara
on it, they are bound to find out that Lara is not tall, and their beliefs will fall in
line with their social commitments, as they should.
Lewis’s basketball scenario is reminiscent of Green’s case of the command-
ing officer who, in a devious attempt to get a soldier court-martialed, issues an
order that is impossible for the soldier to obey. In this case, the officer’s personal
goal may even be common ground between the two parties, but at the same time
it is common ground that the officer is committed to the goal that his order be
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carried out. So again we have two levels of commitment, though in this scenario
both are transparent to both parties. I consider it a virtue of my framework that it
accommodates such cases so easily.
3 Relational commitments
I’m concerned with the primordial form of human communication, which is face
to face and happens on the spot; it involves at most a handful of participants,
who take turns at speaking and being spoken to. I take it that the bulk of human
communication is like this, and that this is also how communication began in our
lineage and begins in our children. Speakers make commitments to addressees,
and commitments are intrinsically relational: there must be a committer and a
committee (with accent on the last syllable), and it is the addressee who is on
the receiving end. Krifka partly agrees, but worries that assertions may be an
exception:
It is plausible that in an assertion, the commitment to the truth of a proposition is of a more
general nature. In particular, if a speaker asserts a proposition the addressee can assume
that the speaker would assert the proposition to other addressees as well (except, of course,
if there are reasons to keep it secret). This is different from promises, which are more like a
contract between the speaker and the addressee only. (p. 80)
In fact, assertions seem to be different in this respect not only from promises,
but also from requests, questions, greetings, and so on. Krifka characterizes
assertions as “public commitments by the speaker to the truth of a proposition”
(p. 79) and contrasts this with my relational analysis. I’m not comfortable with
this way of framing the issue. I would say that commitment making is a public
affair by definition, that it is the iterative structure of common ground that cap-
tures its public aspect, and that this much holds for all speech acts, assertions
included.
According to Brandom (1983, 1994), in asserting that p I both commit myself
to the truth of p and authorize my audience to assert p to others and defer any
justificatory responsibility to me. Since most other speech acts do not imply a
license to reissue, this analysis, if correct, would capture Krifka’s observation
without contradicting that commitments are essentially relational. But actually
I’m not convinced that Brandom’s analysis is entirely correct. Apart from the fact
that much of the information we exchange by way of assertion is confidential (as
Krifka notes, too), I doubt that, in general, we can evade justificatory respons-
ibility for our assertions by deferring to our sources. Be that as it may, it is a
common practice for assertions, and constatives in general, to be reissued, with
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or without permission, but that doesn’t require the supposition that assertional
commitments are non-relational; if anything, the opposite is true.
In my article, I only considered one-on-one instances of commitment. Obvi-
ously, this is a simplification. Either party in a commitment can be a group of
individuals or an institution, and as Kibble notes, such cases argue against an
intentionalist account of speech acts. Kibble also points out that, once we take
into account that an utterance may be heard by more than one individual, all
sorts of complications arise. A student asks me whether Frege was German, and I
answer that he was. The student is my primary addressee, as Kibble calls it, and
therefore my answer causes me to have a commitment to her. But in this case it
seems that I incur the same commitment to each of the other students in the room.
They are part of my audience, too, even if they are not my primary addressees.
And then there may be eavesdroppers in the corridor, whom I didn’t address and
haven’t made a commitment to, but who still may adopt a private commitment as
a consequence of my speech act. As far as I know, this is largely uncharted ter-
ritory, though some charting has been done by Hughes (1984), Clark (1992), and
Meijers (2007).
Commitment is an asymmetrical relation: if I make a promise to you, the com-
mitment is mine, even if it is required that you accept that I have it. With this
proviso, my theory is informed by the tacit assumption that others cannot make
our commitments for us; in this sense, we are autonomous in our commitment
making. Kibble observes that we can license others to make commitments on our
behalf, but this much is consistent with the autonomy constraint.
Referring to Poschmann (2008) and Beyssade and Marandin (2009), De Bra-
banter suggests that at least some directives might be analysed in terms of a
“commitment shift” from speaker to addressee. On this account, if a orders b to
shut the door, the illocutionary effect of a’s speech act is that b becomes commit-
ted to shut the door. This idea clearly violates the autonomy constraint, but there
are other problems with it as well. As I argued in my article, it does seem to be the
case that, as a consequence of ordering b to shut the door, a becomes committed
to act on b will shut the door. The theory adumbrated by De Brabanter leaves
this commitment unaccounted for. Perhaps it could be included in the analysis
of ordering, or perhaps one could suppose, following De Brabanter’s suggestion,
that a can share the commitment imposed on b by her own, i.e. a’s, order; but
neither option seems particularly attractive to me. By contrast, on my analysis of
directives, a’s order causes her to become committed to act on b will shut the
door, and as a rule bwill agree to share a’s commitment. Directives are no differ-
ent from other speech acts in this regard, no special stipulations are needed, and
a and b are left with the correct commitments, while respecting their autonomy.
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Nevertheless, I sympathize with De Brabanter’s concern that my analysis
seems to emphasize the speaker’s commitment at the expense of the addressee’s
projected commitment. I can offer three considerations that may, perhaps,
assuage this unease somewhat. First, if the “apparent reversal of priorities” (as
De Brabanter calls it) is problematic, then my analysis is not the only one in jeop-
ardy. For example, intentionalist theories of illocutionary force typically highlight
speakers’ mental states at the expense of hearers’ prospective actions. Second,
even if one commitment derives from another, that doesn’t render it less import-
ant or less salient. Third, as argued in the last paragraph,my analysis is preferable
for economical and aesthetic reasons.
4 Expressives
In my article, I briefly discussed some speech acts whose main function seems
to be to express psychological states, and suggested that they could be treated
as constatives.2 On this account, an utterance of “I’m sorry there is nutmeg in the
pudding” commits the speaker to being sorry that there is nutmeg in the pudding.
De Brabanter objects that this suggestion creates an imbalance in my account. If
some speech acts are to be analysed this way, why not apply the same analysis
across the illocutionary board? There are several reasons. First, it is generally
agreed, even by dyed-in-the-wool intentionalists, that this will not work for con-
ventional speech acts like “I christen this ship the USS Stormy Daniels.”3 Second,
as it can hardly be denied that we occasionally refer to psychological states, some
of which our own, it is inevitable that the propositional content of at least some
of our speech acts must be about our psychological states. But by the same token,
it is inevitable that the propositional content of at least some speech acts will be
2 Contrary to what De Brabanter suggests, I don’t want to classify greetings with the expressives,
as many authors have done. The basic function of “Hi!” may be to acknowledge the presence of
another person, initiate interaction, or both. At any rate, some sort of commitment does seem to
be involved, though it heavily depends on the context, and is therefore hard to pin down in the
general case. Note, for example, that it will often be considered rude to greet a person and then
ignore her flat out.
3 Harris claims that there is a metaphysical dichotomy between conventional and communicat-
ive acts, which intentonalism gets right and my account fails to capture. However, this alleged
dichotomy is just an artefact of the intentionalist doctrine: conventional acts are those which
the intentionalist approach fails to explain no matter how you look at it. Hardly a compel-
ling argument for stipulating a rift in reality. For discussion of the conventional/communicative
distinction and its history, see Sbisà (2009) and Kissine (2013).
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about lemon curd, and this is patently no reason for supposing that all speech
acts might be analysed as being about lemon curd.
Krifka discusses “emotive” speech acts, which he characterizes as linguistic
means of expressing emotions for which the notion of commitment “feels beside
the point.” (p. 88) His paradigm examples are interjections like “Ouch!” and
“Wow!” Intuitively, it seems wrong to say that these serve the same purpose as
“I am in pain” and “I am surprised”, respectively, and I tend to agree that a
commitment-based analysis may not be appropriate for these interjections; in
which case an intentionalist analysis won’t work, either, by the way. That said, I
have a methodological qualm about Krifka’s discussion. Krifka concedes that the
hearer can extract information from the speaker’s “Ouch!”, and even that it can
be communicative. (Just imagine a little girl rubbing her scratched knee, looking
up at you and whimpering softly: “Ouch!”) But Krifka observes that, even so, one
cannot lie by exclaiming “Ouch!”, and on that basis he concludes that emotives
are not constatives.
My worry is that this argument hinges on what may well be a lexical fluke.
Krifka is surely right that, in English as in some other languages, not every form of
deception counts as lying, but that is a fact about the verb “to lie” which need not
have any bearing on the classification of speech acts. This point becomes acute
when we turn to other cases that Krifka proposes to classify as emotives, like
“What a terriblemistake youmade!”Whereas Krifka takes it to be evident that this
is not a constative, I’m not sure that its communicative effect is markedly different
from “You made a terrible mess”, when uttered with the right intonation. Unfor-
tunately, as things currently stand, we don’t seem to have reliable diagnostics for
settling this and other differences, but at any rate, I doubt that the lying test will
be of much help.
Incidentally, a related objection applies to Green’s claim that we can separate
illocutionary acts from other types (such as locution and perlocution) by applying
the “saying makes it so” constraint: “an illocutionary act is one of a type that can
(though need not be) be performed by saying, under the right conditions, that one
is doing so.” (p. 42) If this is to be more than an informal rule of thumb, the exten-
sion of “illocutionary act” will be determined by the vagaries of the language: an
utterance of “Does your dog bite?” will count as a question only if one’s language
happens to provide the means for referring to question acts.
5 Graded commitments
One theme running through these commentaries is that, somehow or other, com-
mitments seem to come in varying degrees of strength. De Brabanter observes that
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giving advice and making a recommendation are “milder” directives than orders;
Krifka discusses ways of hedging commitments and commitment specifiers, like
“for the life of me” and “honestly”, which he says affect the speaker’s “level of
commitment”; and Green contrasts and compares members of the “assertive fam-
ily” (assertion, conjecture, guessing, and so on), observing, among other things,
that “one who asserts that p takes on a more weighty commitment than one who
puts it forth as an educated guess.” (p. 47, see also Green 2015)
Intuitively, it is clear that the commitments we make by way of our utter-
ances are not always equally strong. But before asking what that might mean, it
should be noted that there are several dimensions of gradedness associated with
speech acts. For example, Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 15) observe that, while
both ordering and pleading are stronger than requesting, “the greater strength
of pleading derives from the intensity of the desire expressed, while the greater
strength of ordering derives from the fact that the speaker uses a position of power
or authority that he has over the hearer.” This illustrates how speech acts vary in
strength along more than one dimension. Commitment is one such dimension,
and the strength of commitment conveyed by a speech act need not agree with its
strength on other dimensions. For example, although pleading is stronger than
requesting in some sense, it may well come with a lower degree of commitment.
There is no need for Betty to plead with Barney to walk the dog if she is confid-
ent that he will do as told, and therefore her pleading may evince a relatively low
degree of commitment to the goal that Barney walk the dog. On the other hand,
if Barney is at Betty’s beck and call, then a mere hint from her (“The dog?”) may
secure his compliance, and a high degree of commitment to Barney will walk
the dog is warranted. In short, illocutionary gradedness is a many-headed mon-
ster, and we must be careful to separate graded commitments from other graded
stuff.
What could it mean for one commitment to be stronger or weaker than
another? Although it may seem tempting to suppose that commitments are
intrinsically graded, like pollution or noise, I prefer to view gradedness as a
meta-property. Once undertaken, commitments persist by default, but every once
in a while they will be retracted, with or without mutual consent (cf. Bratman
1987). One reason for defaulting on a commitment is that it conflicts with another
commitment. If and when this happens, one commitment is given precedence
over another, and my suggestion is that such precedence orderings underlie the
gradedness of our commitments. Precedence orderings could be modeled in a
non-monotonic logic like Horty’s (2012), which might also help to clarify their
role in practical reasoning.
I believe that an analysis along these lines may capture at least some of the
variation in Green’s “assertive family” and at least some of the effects of Krifka’s
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commitment specifiers. I’m less sure that it will also explain the contrast between
requesting and advising that De Brabanter points to. Prima facie, it may seem that
requesting implies a higher level of commitment to a goal than advising. How-
ever, unlike prototypical directives, advising need not be telic at all: a doctor
who advises a patient to reduce her alcohol intake may be strongly commit-
ted to the soundness of his advice, while remaining entirely uncommitted with
respect to the goal he believes his patient should aim for. Since, on the proposed
account, there is a difference between having a weak commitment and having no
commitment whatsoever, there is an important theoretical distinction between
the atelicity of mere advising and the weakness of commitments associated with
some proper directives. But then it is a category mistake to say that advising
conveys a low level of commitment.
6 Normativity
Commitment making is first and foremost a social practice, which people engage
in to coordinate their activities. On the Vygotskian view that I find myself drawn
to, children acquire these practices and turn them on themselves by making
private commitments, which help them to organize their own activities, planning,
and problem solving (Geurts 2018). Social commitment making is a normat-
ive practice, that is to say, a practice that is properly described in terms of
what one should do, is entitled to do, and so on.4 Kibble and Krifka point out
that such normative practices are instilled by means of sanctions ranging from
good-natured correction to capital punishment: we correct others for misspelling
words, chide them for bad manners, and send them to jail for theft. This is how
normativity manifests itself in the social sphere. But if social practices are essen-
tially normative, then we might expect that private commitment making, too, is a
normative practice, and as Kibble observes, it is not obvious that it is, especially
since it is doubtful that we sanction ourselves on a regular basis.
The normativity of private commitments, aka beliefs and intentions, is a
much-debated topic in philosophy, which I cannot begin to do justice to here (see
McHugh and Whiting 2014 and Verbeek 2014 for recent surveys), though I should
mention that, in this literature, it is uncontroversial that beliefs and intentions are
governed by norms. Since Kibble’s worry is specifically about sanctions, it may be
noted that, first impressions notwithstanding, we do sanction ourselves for com-
mitment failures of all sorts. Sanctions are measures taken by party x to make
4 Note that, pace De Brabanter, this is not to say that a commitment-based pragmatics must be
a normative theory. The normativity is in the subject matter, not in the theory.
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party y conform to a norm. Such measures are also used, often enough, if x and
y are the same person. We blame ourselves when our beliefs or intentions fail us
and wemiss a train or overcook a soufflé, for example. On such occasions wemay
even call ourselves names (“Moron!”, “Coward!”) and slap our heads in disap-
proval. Such behaviours are likely functional, too: if you discover that youmissed
your train because you left home too late, your self-directed irritation may help
to improve your future commitment making, reminding you not make the same
mistake again. More generally, it seems plausible to suppose that self-correction
plays a key role in our ongoing business of belief formation and intentionmaking,
and correction is a normative practice if anything is.
7 Acceptance and awareness
On my account, the common ground consists of a basis of zero-order commit-
ments and an infinite set of higher-order commitments generated from this basis,
courtesy of the acceptance principle:
Acceptance: Ca,bp entails Ca,bCa,bp and Cb,aCa,bp.
What this says is just that a cannot have a commitment to b unless a and b are
each committed to the other that a has that commitment. That is all there is
to it. Unfortunately, while I intended to use it as a mere term of art, the word
“acceptance” connotes awareness, which seems to have caused a certain amount
of overinterpretation: Kibble detects some equivocation inmy treatment of accept-
ance, and according to De Brabanter, my theory entails that, “for a commitment to
hold, both parties must be aware of it and must have somehow ratified it.” (p. 32)
However, although I should have expressed myself more clearly, I emphatically
reject the notion that acceptance requires awareness. Indeed, it would be suicidal
for me to suppose that it did, because it is the recursive application of the accept-
ance principle that generates the infinitely many higher-order commitments that
make up most of the common ground. If acceptance required awareness, my
theory of common ground would be a non-starter.
If the speaker undertakes a commitment, both speaker and hearer must
accept that the speaker has that commitment, for otherwise he hasn’t. In many
cases, the hearer’s acceptance is implied by her sharing the speaker’s commit-
ment: if a asks b a question, for example, and b responds by giving an answer,
then b’s response entails that she shares a’s commitment, which in its turn
entails that b accepts a’s commitment. However, in some cases, acceptance is
signalled specifically, e.g., by head movements or vocalizations like “mm-hmm”
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or “uh-huh”.5 Interestingly, such signals seem to go under the awareness radar
much of the time, so even if acceptance is acknowledged specifically (which it
often isn’t), acknowledgements are likely to be sent and received subliminally.
8 Implicatures
Although Grice’s theory of cooperative communication is traditionally presented
in psychological terms, I argue that this is not necessary. First, the Gricean max-
ims are almost entirely devoid of psychological elements; the only exception is
the first sub-maxim of Quality, “Do not say what you believe to be false”, which
in my account gives way to a more general maxim, Integrity, which is defined in
terms of commitment. Second, although Grice casts the reasoning that underpins
conversational implicatures in psychological terms, those terms are dispensable
without loss.
De Brabanter contests my first point: he claims, in effect, that the second sub-
maxim of Quality, “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”, relies
on a psychological notion that reappears in my reformulation, namely “evid-
ence”. But is this a psychological term? Sometimes, we use it to refer to “the kind
of thing which one might place in a plastic bag and label ‘Exhibit A’ ” (Kelly 2016:
1), and surely there is nothing psychological about that. Like property, evidence is
the kind of thing one can have unknowingly. But on the other hand, sometimes,
and these are the times De Brabanter has in mind, we cite as evidence that we
have seen this or that, and presumably seeing is a psychological process. So the
question to ask is this: is it a problem for my account that, occasionally, providing
evidence requires that we refer to our psychological states?
My answer to this question is no, for the following reason. Performing a
speech act may imply that one is capable of justifying the commitments it entails
(cf. Brandom 1983, 1994 on assertion). Even if this may require making reference
to psychological states, being able to provide acceptable justifications is a multi-
faceted skill, but is not itself of a psychological nature. Therefore, it may well be a
competence that is acquired piecemeal, step by unhurried step, and the psycho-
logical facets of it may arrive relatively late. If this much is true, De Brabanter’s
observation need not present a problem for my account.
Like the Gricean schema for deriving implicatures, my version starts with the
observation that “the speaker has said that p.” This prompts Green to present me
with a false dilemma: “saying that p” must either refer to a locutionary act, in
5 These signals seem to be ambivalent, in that they may indicate sharing or merely acceptance.
See Enfield (2017: 107–117) for discussion.
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which case my schema won’t work, or to an illocutionary act, but then I have
to take on board “whatever suite of communicative intentions are needed for
an instance of speaker meaning.” (p. 48) Here Green presupposes something
that is not common ground, viz. that illocutionary force requires an intentionalist
account. For those of us who reject that premiss, as I do, “saying that p” need not
be construed in psychological terms, and Green’s objection falls flat.
Further on in his discussion of implicatures, Green begs the question once
again: “Normally, a plain-vanilla use of the indicative mood is sufficient to
express a belief whose content is the same as the content asserted; further, expres-
sion is not a case of speaker meaning and so not a case of implicature either.”
(p. 50) On the face of it, this may look like an argument against my view that
“expressing belief” by way of an indicative can be accounted for in terms of
implicature. But as a matter of fact, Green merely presents his own opinion. Put-
ting together his view that the illocutionary effect of assertion is to express a
belief withmy view that this belief is derivable as an implicature, Green concludes
that my account must be wrong, because it conflates assertion with implicature.
Hence, what Green’s argument boils down to is that I’mwrong because he is right.
Onmy account, there are various ways in which speech acts can convey men-
tal states, but the most important route is via social commitments: I assert that
Louis de Funès was the first president of the Fifth Republic, thereby become com-
mitted to my audience that this is the case, and my thus committing myself may
implicate that I believe what I say.6 Harris claims that this order of explanation
can be reversed, and that social commitments are derivable from communicat-
ive intentions manifested by speakers. If he was right about this, it would further
the intentionalist cause considerably. But unfortunately for Harris his reasoning
is defective. Take the case of promising:
[If you make me a promise], you intend me to form a belief about your intentions—and so
an expectation about your actions—that will factor into my practical reasoning about what
to do. If you break your promise, uncoordinated action is likely to result and I am within
my rights to criticize you for knowingly putting us into the incoherent state that led to our
failure. (p. 64)
This may seem mildly plausible until one realises that commitments are not
necessarily contingent on cooperation in the way Harris’s argument requires. For
example, if I make a promise that is obviously false, it is common ground between
us that I don’t intend to honour my commitment, yet I do have a commitment.
Clearly, speech acts have normative effects even if cooperativity cannot be taken
6 “May”, not “must”: if I make the same statement in response to a question in a quiz show, it
may be transparent that I’m guessing, but I will still have committed myself.
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for granted. My theory allows for this; Harris’s doesn’t. Speaking more generally,
it seems to me that the prospects of an intention-based account of normativity
are dim, simply because I don’t see how social normativity could derive from the
expression of private states.
Whereas Harris and I agree that either commitments or intentions must come
first in a theory of speech acts, Zaefferer advocates an egalitarian treatment that
puts these two notions on a par. Although I don’t want to deny that this view
may have its advantages, it must be noted that one important advantage of a non-
egalitarian approach is lost on Zaefferer’s account: it rules out the possibility of
deriving commitments from intentions, or vice versa.
9 Can kids do it?
Intentionalism is the view that a speech act expresses a communicative intention
of the speaker’s, which the hearer must grasp in order for communication to be
achieved. A communicative intention is a higher-order psychological state: it is an
intention that is intended to be recognized as such. A common worry is that this
puts the standard for successful communication so high that it becomes unattain-
able for three-year-olds, who would seem to be pretty effective communicators.7
A remarkably popular response to this worry is to bite the bullet and maintain
that three-year-olds have the conceptual resources for dealing with communicat-
ive intentions, after all. Zaefferer and Harris are drawn to this view, and the latter
argues as follows:
1. There is empirical evidence that toddlers and even infants are capable of
“mind reading”, i.e. predicting and explaining other agents’ behaviour by
attributing mental states to them.
2. There is a view to the effect that “infants possess the conceptual capacity for
mindreading but haven’t yet fully developed some of the cognitive resources
needed to deploy it in adult-like ways.” (p. 56)8
7 In my article I took it for granted that this implies that children must be able to attribute inten-
tions before they can understand promises. This is Harris’s view, too, but not Green’s, who avers
that one “may deny that the order of conceptual analysis has to correspond to any temporal
series.” (p. 41) As a general principle, this is obviously correct, but in this particular case I fail to
see how it could be true, and as I already mentioned in the introduction, I’m not the only one.
8 According to Harris, this view is supported by Rubio-Fernández and Geurts (2013). I reject that
allegation, as does my co-author.
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3. Supposing that this view is correct, “young children may be good enough
mindreaders to begin learning how to perform and interpret speech acts, even
if we shouldn’t expect them to communicate like adults.” (ibid.)
The empirical evidence onwhich this argument hinges is controversial, and that’s
putting it exceedingly mildly. As detailed by Rakoczy and Behne, most of the
experimental measures on which the evidence is based have failed to replicate,
and to the extent that they do replicate, their validity is in doubt. Rakoczy and
Behne’s conclusion is that “in light of the existing evidence, we do not know
whether there is indeed such a thing as implicit [mind reading] before age 4.”
(p. 94)
This is enough to dismiss Harris’s argument, but let’s follow his line of reas-
oning a bit further. What if the empirical evidence had been robust?Would it then
have supported the intentionalist cause? No. The experimental measures that can
be used in studies with infants and toddlers are, of necessity, very indirect, or
“implicit” as Rakoczy and Behne put it, and long before it became clear that the
data are of poor quality, their interpretationwas quitemoot. The resolute nativism
that Harris pins his hopes on may be an option, but there are alternative theories
on offer that are considerably less stipulative. The notion that infants have the
conceptual resources for mind reading but have a hard time employing them is
like the view that the pyramids of Giza were built by extraterrestrial visitors: it is
an intriguing hypothesis, for sure, but there are others to be considered first.
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